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Adjudication of Election Petitions: How Have Courts Fared?

Ritwika Sharma

Titiksha Mohanty

The dominant discourse around elections seems to focus on the smooth conduct of the process, the suitability and eligibility of candidates, and the limits of actions deemed acceptable during the crucial period of campaigning. This chapter focuses on judicial determination of disputes arising out of elections, an aspect that follows the culmination of the conduct of elections.

Transparency, along with appropriate judicial scrutiny, is a marker of free and fair elections.1 Generally, judicial scrutiny of elections occurs when the validity of the election or the election of a particular candidate is challenged on certain grounds. While there are established statutory as well as judicial frameworks for trying election petitions, there are serious concerns as to their efficacy and expediency.

Part I of this chapter provides an introduction to the statutory position on election petitions. This is followed by some thoughts on how the judiciary plays an important role in the electoral process, and how securing the integrity of this process is as much a function of the courts as any other branch of the government. In a way, Part I places election disputes in the context of the judicial framework. Part II gives an overview of the performance of the courts (which form part of this analysis) in the disposal of election petitions. This part presents certain numbers around average time taken for disposal and compares this with the time limit provided under the Representation of People Act, 1951. Part III gives a bird’s eye view of the problem by highlighting certain aspects of the judicial process which operate as roadblocks to the expeditious disposal of election petitions. This part encompasses an analysis of the data pertaining to trial of election petitions which was collected from official websites of five High Courts and the Supreme Court of India. This chapter closes with the thought that in view of the importance of election petitions for the electoral process, as well as for the Indian democracy, it is imperative that existing reform recommendations be implemented suitably.

Election Disputes and Judicial Intervention

Article 329 of the Constitution of India prescribes that any election to one of the Houses of Parliament or to the state legislature can be called in question only by means of an election petition presented to an authority and in a manner prescribed by the relevant law. Much like the rights to elect and be elected, the right to dispute an election is also statutory and not fundamental. In Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal,2 the Supreme Court held categorically:

Outside of statute, there is no right to elect, no right to be elected and no right to dispute an election. Statutory creations they are, and therefore, subject to statutory limitation. An election petition is not an action in Common Law, nor in equity. It is a statutory proceeding to which neither the common law nor the principles of equity apply but only those rules which the statute makes and applies.3

In this regard, the Representation of People Act, 1951 (hereafter, RP Act, 1951) provides for the procedural as well as substantive particulars for institution and trial of election petitions. Section 80A of the RP Act, 1951 mandates that the jurisdiction to try an election petition rests with the High Court, and shall be exercised by a single judge thereof. An election petition calling in question any election may be presented to the High Court on one or more of the following grounds.4

  1. If a returned candidate was not qualified or was disqualified to be chosen to fill the seat under the Constitution, the RP Act, 1951, or the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963.
  2. If the returned candidate or his election agent committed any corrupt practices.
  3. If any nomination has been improperly rejected.
  4. If the result of the election, so far as it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially affected:
    1. By the improper acceptance of any nomination.
    2. By any corrupt practice committed in the interest of the returned candidate (by an agent other than his/her election agent).
    3. By the improper reception, refusal, or rejection of any vote, or the reception of any vote which is void.
    4. By any non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or the RP Act, 1951 (or the rules or regulations made under the Act).
  5. If any person claims a declaration that he/she himself/herself or any other candidate has been duly elected.

The role played by the judiciary in the electoral process garners heightened significance in the aftermath of elections. By virtue of its constitutional function, the judiciary is rendered responsible for securing the integrity of elections through the process of resolving any disputes that may arise. Legal battles are fought concerning the minutiae of election procedures, ranging from the propriety of someone’s candidature and campaign practices to the validity of election results. Keeping in mind the practical and symbolic ramifications that the trial of a returned candidate has for the democratic process, the relevance of the judiciary’s role in hearing election petitions is elevated manifold. Tasked with easing social tensions between candidates and striking an appropriate balance between majoritarian sentiments of elections and the rule of law—while also exercising restraint from unduly interfering in the democratic process of elections—courts often find themselves in delicate yet critical positions.

As Ely opines, the court’s power as a neutral arbiter of the democratic process to ensure its integrity stems from the mandate that judicial review of elections through election petitions assists in ensuring that those who are in positions of power do not choke off channels of political change to ensure they remain ‘in’ while the ‘outs will stay out’.6 Courts then routinely assume a limited but reactive role of a rule-evaluating and rule-enforcing mechanism of ensuring fair play in the elections.7 As Gloppen notes, this role of the courts as referees of the electoral competition further enhances and facilitates democracy.

Given the paramount importance of election petitions, especially in terms of the consequences of the candidature of the returned candidate to the State Legislative Assembly or the Parliament, sensitivity of time is a recurrent theme. Operating within the constraints of a heavily burdened legal system, election petitions often face the predicament of being perennially prolonged due to systemic delays.8 The issue of the urgent need for expeditious disposal of election petitions has routinely found mention in numerous legislative, judicial, and administrative documents. Although the 170th Report of the Law Commission on the ‘Reform of the Electoral Laws’9 discarded the idea of instituting specialised tribunals for election petitions, the same was again proposed later by the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (hereafter, the NCRWC). The NCRWC recommended that special election benches should be constituted in the High Courts earmarked exclusively for the disposal of election petitions.10 This recommendation was further emphasised by the Second Administrative Reforms Commission, which recommended the setting up of Special Tribunals as provided for under Article 323B of the Constitution.11

Furthermore, the 1990 Dinesh Goswami Committee Report also proposed the appointment of ad hoc judges so as to relieve regular judges from their normal duty for the purpose of entrusting to them the trial of election petitions.12 The issue was next discussed elaborately in the 255th Law Commission Report on ‘Select Electoral Reforms’. This report noted that procedural delays in the disposal of election petitions could be attributed to various factors ranging from over-burdened judges, and lack of institutional support and resources, to legal tactics by parties’ counsels meant to intentionally impede quick resolution of petitions. This institutional inertia against timely disposal of election petitions renders the right to any relief illusory.

The differences in procedures across certain High Courts also adds a layer of complexity to the study of election petitions. The procedures differ as to the allocation of election petitions where a High Court has multiple benches. The Gauhati High Court, despite having benches in some of the states which are under its jurisdiction, entertains election petitions only at the Principal Bench in Guwahati.13 In case of High Courts exclusively meant for one state which have multiple benches across the state with jurisdiction over specified parts or areas of those states, election petitions can be filed either in the principal bench relating to all parts of the state or only before that bench which has exclusive jurisdiction over the area from which the election took place.14 As noted by the Law Commission, the combined effects of a procedure that is non-uniform across High Courts, excessively formalistic with regards to form instead of the content, inordinate delays in the trial, and exacerbated further by a system of automatic appeals to the Supreme Court on both law and fact, create a heavily unsustainable mechanism for the disposal of petitions.15

Disposal of Election Petitions— How do the Courts Fare?

In its 255th Report, the Law Commission of India rued the inadequacy of information available on the average time spent in concluding the trial and hearing an election petition. Taking a cue from this observation, this chapter focuses on the issue of time spent on disposal of election petitions by courts in India. For the purpose of this chapter, we chose to study election petitions decided by the Supreme Court, and the High Courts of Gauhati, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka,16 and Madhya Pradesh.17

While the selection of High Courts was aimed at ensuring adequate representation from all geographical regions in India, we had to work with the constraints around availability of data on High Courts’ websites. An attempt to compensate for the absence of information from other regions/High Courts has been made by analysing data from the Supreme Court, which serves as an arbiter of election appeals from across the country. Our data set consisted of election petitions which were filed, in the courts chosen for this analysis, after 1 January 2008. The data set comprises both disposed as well as pending cases (cases which are currently pending before a certain High Court or the Supreme Court). We considered and analysed cases which were characterised using case types ‘E.P.’ (for the Gauhati, Karnataka, and Madhya Pradesh High Courts), ‘EL.P.’ (for the Himachal Pradesh High Court), and ‘Election Petition (Civil)’ (for the Supreme Court of India).

During the selected time period, two assembly elections took place in each of the states, corresponding to the High Courts chosen. To specify, the last two assembly elections (for states who are under the jurisdiction of the Gauhati High Court) were conducted in Arunachal Pradesh in 2014 and 2009, in Assam in 2016 and 2011, in Mizoram in 2018 and 2013, and in Nagaland in 2018 and 2013. Further, Assembly elections were conducted in Himachal Pradesh in 2017 and 2012, in Karnataka in 2018 and 2013, and in Madhya Pradesh in 2018 and 2013. General elections were last held in 2014, and in 2009 before that.

A total of 1,791 judicial orders were analysed for the purpose of this study, which included 303 orders from the Gauhati High Court (across 18 election petitions), 56 orders from the High Court of Himachal Pradesh (in eight election petitions), 145 orders from the High Court of Karnataka (in 20 election petitions), 1,038 from the Madhya Pradesh High Court (in 48 election petitions), and 249 from the Supreme Court (in 192 election petitions). The key elements noted were the date on which each election petition was filed, and the date on which the final order/judgment was passed. Where High Courts had not assigned a date of filing for cases instituted therein, the date of registration has been considered. This information was collected and analysed for two reasons—first, to ascertain the time elapsed between the date when the election petition is first presented to the High Court and the date of disposal of the election petition, and second, to understand what are the potential bottlenecks which obstruct the timely disposal of these election petitions.

The RP Act, 1951 provides that every election petition shall be tried as expeditiously as possible and efforts shall be made to conclude the trial within six months from the date on which the petition is presented before the High Court.18 To enable expeditious disposal of election petitions, Section 86(6) of the RP Act, 1951 provides that the trial of an election petition shall, so far as is practicable, consistently with the interests of justice, be continued on a day-to-day basis until its conclusion. This sub-section also provides that where a judge finds it necessary to adjourn the trial of the petition to a date beyond the following day of its hearing, he is obliged by law to record his reasons for the same. Further, it is a settled position that all the proceedings commencing with the presentation of the election petition and up to the date of decision therein are included within the meaning of the word ‘trial’.19

Figure 3.2.1 represents the average days to disposal for the trial of election petitions in all the four High Courts. For the Gauhati, Himachal Pradesh, and Karnataka High Courts, the average days to disposal have been arrived at by calculating the days spent by each of these High Courts between the date of filing till the date of final order/ judgment. For the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the points of reference are the date of registration of the election petition, and the date when the final order/judgment was delivered.

figure 3.2.1. Average Days Taken for Disposal of Election Petitions

The Madhya Pradesh High Court took 1,188 days on an average, which translate approximately to 39 months. The Karnataka High Court and the Himachal Pradesh took 929 days and 923 days respectively (approximately 30 months), while the Gauhati High Court took 818 days (approximately 27 months). None of these figures sit even remotely close to the time limit of six months that the RP Act, 1951 requires.

Figures 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 represent the average time taken in months by the Gauhati and Madhya Pradesh High Courts for the trial of election petitions.20

figure 3.2.2.Gauhati High Court—Time Taken for Trial of Election Petitions

In the Gauhati High Court, more than half (53 per cent) of the election petitions analysed took more than two years to get disposed. Twentynine per cent took between one and two years while 12 per cent took somewhere between six months and one year. The time limit of six months could be met only in 6 per cent of the election petitions.

figure 3.2.3.Madhya Pradesh High Court—Time Taken for Trial of Election Petitions

Trial of 68 per cent of the election petitions filed in the Madhya Pradesh High Court took more than two years. Fourteen per cent took between 1–2 years, 9 per cent were disposed within six months to a year while the remaining nine per cent took up to six months.

figure 3.2.4.Karnataka High Court—Time Taken for Trial of Election Petitions

In the Karnataka High Court, 53 per cent of the election petitions took more than two years to get disposed. Twenty-one per cent took between 1–2 years, five per cent were disposed within six months to a year while the remaining 21 per cent took up to six months.

Based on an analysis of the orders passed during the trial of election petitions, it would be a platitude to say that the time limit of six months has been mostly rendered aspirational. In what follows, this chapter will discuss some of the recurring themes that are common to the trial of election petitions analysed across the chosen courts. The analysis of these themes will reveal how trials of election petitions have been unravelling in our courts, and the gaps that need to be plugged for addressing concerns regarding delays in disposal.

Some recurring bottlenecks

Frequent Adjournments/Adjournments on Insubstantial Grounds

In the Madhya Pradesh High Court, 1,038 orders that were analysed were borne out of 48 election petitions filed and tried over the chosen period of 10 years. Similarly, the 303 orders analysed for the Gauhati High Court were made in a total of 18 election petitions. The manner in which trial in these election petitions proceeds is quite telling. The Madhya Pradesh High Court has been prone to granting adjournments to counsels of both sides and being extremely accommodating of reasons, such as inability of respondent counsel to read the election petition,21 confusion about date of appearance caused due to the court declaring a holiday,22 and absence of respondent counsel due to a ceremony at his house.23 The Madhya Pradesh High Court also witnessed adjournments due to abstention of work in the court. Such abstention was attributable to a number of reasons, some of which included a call for strike by the State Bar Council and designation of certain work weeks for conduct of National Lok Adalat. Figure 3.2.5 represents the most frequently cited grounds for adjournments in the Madhya Pradesh High Court.

Out of the total number of adjournments, 27 per cent were due to the non-appearance of the advocate from the respondent’s side, while 22 per cent were caused by the absence of petitioners’ advocates, indicating that the absence of the parties’ advocates themselves significantly contributed to the delay in

figure 3.2.5.Reasons for Adjournments—Madhya Pradesh High Court

trial. Absence of witnesses also caused significant delays in the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The court’s annoyance at the absence of witnesses was palpable in the case of Kamal Patel v. Ram Kishore Dogne24, when it chided the petitioner for keeping the petition pending for four years by not appearing as a witness even once. Abstention of work in the court took up 13 per cent of the adjournments caused.

Similarly, the petitions filed in the Gauhati High Court faced routine adjournments on grounds ranging from absence of parties and counsels due to bad weather25 and ill-health of counsel, parties or their family members.26 Declaration of frequent bandhs also resulted in adjournments.27 Delays were also caused due to lack of access to translators and interpreters who could aid and assist the courts in conversing in the local language.28 Additionally, for some cases where procuring physical evidence involved summoning officials to appear before court, the process was delayed further on account of unavailability of personnel.29 Figure 3.2.6 represents the most frequently cited grounds for adjournments in the Gauhati High Court. Twenty-eight per cent of the adjournments were attributable to improper service of notice, mostly due to incorrect addresses on record.30 Non-appearance of parties’ advocates, witnesses, and the parties themselves accounted for 23 per cent, 16 per cent, and 13 per cent adjournments respectively.

figure 3.2.6.Reasons for Adjournments—Gauhati High Court

The High Courts of Himachal Pradesh and Karnataka witnessed delays attributable to a variety of reasons. In Himachal Pradesh High Court, faulty issue of notice was a recurrent theme in certain petitions. Mostly due to incorrect name or address of the recipient, this factor caused delays in the initial stages of summoning the parties and the witnesses.31 Procedural delays were also attributable to the conduct of the parties during trial. In Karnataka, a recurring theme was the lackadaisical attitude of the petitioners in rectifying office objections. In three of the 20 election petitions analysed in Karnataka,32 the High Court made orders for dismissal on the ground of the petitioners’ inability to rectify office objection in time (which the Court construed to be the petitioners’ disinterest in taking the election petition through its due course).

There were also instances of petitions being disposed in their entirety on account of complete absence of attendance of either of the parties.33 This was also observed in the petitions filed in the Himachal Pradesh High Court. In the Supreme Court, there have been numerous instances where the case was adjourned due to absence of both parties as well as their counsels.34 The most pertinent observation regarding the behaviour of errant parties was made in Pukhrem Sharatchandra Singh v. Mairembam Prithviraj.35 The Supreme Court observed that voters entrust their faith in an elected candidate which makes it significant that when the candidate faces an assail to their election, they should be proactive in freeing themselves from the allegations, and not take shelter in seeking adjournments with the hope that they can be triumphant in the contest by the passage of time.36

Delays Induced by Filing of Interim Applications (IAs) and Examination of Witnesses

One would assume that election petitions, by their very nature, are crucial cogs in the giant wheel of democracy and hence should not be subjected to the delays that otherwise plague the justice dispensation mechanism. It is then surprising to note that on several occasions, the trial of an election petition begins to resemble a private litigation between two parties, with numerous IAs being filed (and countered). While filing of IAs by itself may not be worrisome, the delay that they induce in the trial is. In the High Courts of Madhya Pradesh and Karnataka, the filing of IAs and replies thereto, followed by hearings on the same, added significantly to the time spent on trial of election petitions. For instance, in Vivek Tiwari v. Divyaraj Singh,37 the Madhya Pradesh High Court heard as many as 20 IAs during the life cycle of the entire case. These IAs were filed by the parties on a range of matters including praying for rejection of the election petition, permission to adduce secondary evidence, recalling of certain witnesses, striking off the names of some parties from the list of respondents, and application for grant of adjournment. This particular case took three years and 10 months to reach its conclusion (over a staggering 1,400 days, which is higher than the average 1,188 days election petitions took for disposal in the Madhya Pradesh High Court).38

All parties to an election petition are free to lead documentary evidence as well as oral evidence for proving or disproving the averments made in the petition.39 But, under Section 87 of the RP Act, 1951, a High Court has the discretion to refuse to examine any witness, or witnesses, if it is of the opinion that their evidence is not material for the decision of the election petition, or that the party tendering the witness or witnesses is doing the same on frivolous grounds. The position around examination of witnesses in election petitions was summarised in Quamarul Islam v. S.K. Kanta40 where the Supreme Court held that High Courts must carefully scrutinise the list of witnesses before summoning them for evidence. Parties should be required to submit their lists of witnesses so as to put the opposite party on notice about the evidence sought to be adduced and also, to bind the summoning party to adduce relevant evidence as detailed in the list.

In the orders analysed, quite often, IAs were filed to bring on record additional documents as well as witnesses. The Supreme Court has observed that in the trial of election petitions, examinationin- chief as well as cross examination should be efficiently controlled and unnecessary leeway in delayed production of evidence should be avoided.41 Despite this direction, High Courts (particularly the Madhya Pradesh High Court) have been extremely liberal with regard to the time they allow parties on examination of witnesses. In Mahaveer Prasad Manjhi v. Gyan Singh,42 an election petition filed on 6 January 2017, the examination of witnesses and recording of evidence took a whopping 13 months and eight days, with the process commencing on 4 October 2017 and ending on 12 November 2018. This was hardly a one-off incident, with the Madhya Pradesh High Court having spent nearly two years (22 months and 30 days) in examining witnesses in the petition filed in Radhe Shyam Dhakad v. Jaivardhan Singh.43 To put things in perspective, the court spent nearly 60 per cent of the total time it spent on this case in examining witnesses.44 The irony was that in one particular order in this case, the High Court noted that while election petitions have to be disposed within six months, inordinate delays in examination of witnesses add to the time spent in disposal!45 A similar situation was also seen in Bharat Chandra Narah v. Naba Kumar Doley,46 an election petition filed in the Gauhati High Court. The case included 50 separate orders, spanning six years, with 64 per cent of its time spent in examining witnesses alone.

Petitions Rendered Infructuous in the Supreme Court Due to Efflux of Time

Section 116A of the RP Act, 1951 provides for a statutory right to appeal on questions of law and fact from orders of High Courts to the Supreme Court. It was observed that most election petitions filed in the Supreme Court were in the form of a Civil Appeal or a Special Leave Petition from a trial pending in a certain High Court that is filed against the High Court’s interlocutory order.47 While a majority of these were disposed of in the first instance based on further instructions to the High Court, a considerable number of cases were ‘rendered infructuous’ by the Supreme Court due to the efflux of time, specifically due to the fact that the cause of action against the candidature of the elected candidate was redundant on account of fresh elections that had been held, or were to be held. Out of the 249 orders perused for the Supreme Court between 2008–2019, 5.6 per cent of the cases were categorically declared to be infructuous by the Court due to efflux of time.48

In Pukhrem Sharatchandra Singh v. Mairembam Prithviraj,49 the Supreme Court noted (per Justice Dipak Misra, as he then was) that expeditious disposal of an election petition sustains the purity of parliamentary democracy. In this case, the court further noted with displeasure that the elected candidate had taken time at his own pleasure and leisure, and filed numerous obstructing applications, emboldened by the Manipur High Court (where the case originated) that had granted adjournments in an extremely liberal manner. In Navjot Singh Sidhu v. Om Prakash Soni,50 the court, while noting the futility of the petition due to the efflux of time, categorically mentioned that any deliberation of the issues posited in the petition would be merely academic at that point.

figure 3.2.7.Supreme Court—Time Taken for Trial of Election Petitions

Figure 3.2.7 represents the average time taken in months by the Supreme Court for the trial of election petitions. It is also pertinent to note that while only certain select cases were rendered infructuous, the majority of cases remained pending in the Supreme Court for more than two years. Specifically, for those cases that were appeals against interlocutory orders, by necessary implication, their parent cases in their respective High Courts were further delayed.

Conclusion

Judicial control over elections is exercised, most significantly, through election petitions. The responsibility for timely disposal of election petitions lies in the hands of not only courts, but also contesting parties. Unsuccessful candidates (in an election) may be prone to filing election petitions in courts without any real merit. Seeking of frequent adjournments adds to the life cycle of cases while also clogging the workload of the court itself. One of the ways in which election petitions can be expeditiously disposed, is if courts come down heavily on parties who protract the litigation. In the Karnataka High Court, a recurring theme was uninterested petitioners who did not actively pursue the petitions they filed, much to the displeasure of the Court. Frequent adjournments (on insubstantial, even flimsy, grounds) should be kept in check to speed up election petitions, and generally unclog the judicial process.

While this chapter is not an exhaustive study on the magnitude of the issues surrounding disposal of election petitions, it is meant to start a conversation about how these petitions, despite their immense significance for a healthy democracy, are being treated by courts just like other cases filed in the court. Election petitions are also a means to ensure accountability among the candidates for their actions. Timely disposal of election petitions signals to the candidates that they cannot flout the provisions of the RP Act, 1951, or other applicable laws, without facing repercussions. For a healthy democracy to flourish, it is necessary that citizens have faith in the judicial system to set right any electoral malpractices. Controversies around elections may arise due to the actions of the candidates or the election officers. Timely and expeditious disposal of election petitions will ensure that everyone involved in the electoral process is held accountable.

Keeping in view the time taken (on average) to dispose election petitions, perhaps it is also time that the statutory position (under the RP Act, 1951) catches up with the reality of the judicial process. As mentioned, numerous times in this chapter, the time limit of six months mentioned in the RP Act, 1951 is not being strictly adhered to. Given the fact that in the case of election petitions, High Courts are actually conducting a trial (as opposed to performing an appellate or review function), the possibility of amending the RP Act, 1951 to provide realistic timelines for disposal of election petitions should be mulled. Timelines that are calculated scientifically, within which various stages of the trial must be completed, might give the High Courts more strictly enforceable standards which the parties will have to abide by. These timelines might also act as a curb on the incessant filing of IAs as well as other delaying tactics which are routinely employed by parties themselves.

Election petitions are necessary to do justice within the electoral and democratic process. An eligible voter’s vote may be rendered useless if the result of the election is challenged and a decisive pronouncement on such a challenge takes inordinately long to reach a decision. The irony is that the controversies surrounding election petitions have merited enough concerns amongst policymakers, which is probably the reason why the Law Commission, NCRWC as well as the Election Commission of India have made numerous recommendations on resolving delays and pendency arising during the trial of election petitions. The challenge now is to implement those reforms which can address the underlying issues most effectively. For that to happen, a systematic study of election petitions across all High Courts in India is the urgent need of the hour.

Notes

  1. V.S. Ramadevi and S.K. Mendiratta. 2006. How India Votes: Election Laws, Practice and Procedure. New Delhi: Lexis Nexis Butterworths, p. 1006.
  2. (1982) 1 SCC 691.
  3. Jyoti Basu, para 8.
  4. Sections 100(1) and 101, RP Act, 1951.
  5. Section 79(f), RP Act, 1951 defines ‘returned candidate’ to mean a candidate whose name has been published as duly elected in the election results.
  6. John Hart Ely. 1980. Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, p. 87.
  7. Siri Gloppen, Emmanuel Kazimbazi, and Alexander Kibandama. 2008. ‘Elections in Court: The Judiciary and Uganda’s 2006 Election Process’, in Julius Kiiza, Sabiti Makara, and Lise Rakner (eds), Electoral Democracy in Uganda: Understanding the Institutional Processes and Outcomes of the 2006 Multiparty Elections, pp. 1–4. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.
  8. Rakesh Bhatnagar. 2015. ‘Perennially Pending: Election Cases that Stretch on Endlessly Taint our Democracy’, Scroll.in, 10 October, available online at https://scroll.in/article/760025/perennially-pending-election-cases-that-stretch-on-endlessly-taint-our-democracy (accessed on 11 April 2019).
  9. Law Commission of India. 1999. Report No. 170: Reform of the Electoral Laws. New Delhi: Government of India, para 1.3.6, available online at http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/lc170.htm#LAW%20COMMISSION%20OF%20INDIA (accessed on 11 April 2019).
  10. National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution. 2002. Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution. New Delhi: Government of India, chapter 4, available online at http://legalaffairs.gov.in/sites/default/files/chapter%204.pdf (accessed on 11 April 2019).
  11. Second Administrative Reforms Commission. 2007. Fourth Report: Ethics in Governance. New Delhi: Government of India, p. 17, available online at https://darpg.gov.in/sites/default/files/ethics4.pdf (accessed on 11 April 2019).
  12. Committee on Electoral Reforms. 1990. Report of the Committee on Electoral Reforms. New Delhi: Government of India, p. 51, available online at https://adrindia.org/sites/default/files/Dinesh%20Goswami%20Report%20on%20Electoral%20Reforms.pdf (accessed on 11 April 2019).
  13. Ramadevi and Mendiratta, How India Votes, p. 1021.
  14. Ramadevi and Mendiratta, How India Votes, p. 1021.
  15. Law Commission of India. 2015. Report No. 255: Electoral Reforms. New Delhi: Government of India, pp. 174–175, available online at http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report255.pdf (accessed on 11 April 2019).
  16. Election petitions are considered by the Principal Seat of the Karnataka High Court (Bengaluru) as well as the other two benches (Dharwad and Kalaburgi).
  17. Election petitions are considered by the Principal Seat of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Jabalpur) as well as the other two benches (Gwalior and Indore).
  18. Section 86(7), RP Act, 1951.
  19. Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh, AIR 1957 SC 444, para 15(1); Kailash v. Nankhu, (2005) 4 SCC 480, para 13. For civil suits, the trial begins when the issues are framed and the case is set down for recording of evidence. This general rule is not applicable for election petitions.
  20. For the Gauhati High Court, the dates of filing and the dates of final orders/judgments have been considered. For the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the date of registration of the election petition has been considered.
  21. Vivek Tiwari v. Divyaraj Singh (EP 04/2014), order dated 29 November 2016.
  22. Radhe Shyam Dhakad v. Jaivardhan Singh (EP 05/2014), order dated 8 July 2016. While this case was being heard, 7 July 2016 was declared a holiday on occasion of Eid and the petitioner could not produce his witness on the actual date of hearing (8 July 2016) citing confusion regarding dates.
  23. Radhe Shyam Dhakad v. Jaivardhan Singh (EP 05/2014), order dated 31 January 2017.
  24. (EP 24/2014), order dated 5 April 2018.
  25. Atum Welly v. Kameng Dolo, El. Pet. 2/2014, order dated 29 July 2015.
  26. Bharat Chandra Narah v. Naba Kumar Doley, El. Pet. 2/2011, order dated 17 November 2015, 22 January 2015, 30 September 2015, and 17 November 2015. See also, Matiur Rahman v. The Deputy Commissioner cum District Election Officer, Nagaon, El. Pet. 5/2011, order dated 4 January 2012 and 14 March 2012; Janak Lal Basumatary v. Naba Kumar Sarania Hira, El. Pet 3/2014, order dated 11 February 2015; Zeneisiile Ate Loucii v. Neiphrezo Keditsu, El. Pet. 1/2015, order dated 19 April 2016 and 19 July 2016. In the Himachal Pradesh High Court, see Balbir Singh v. Secretary (Election) to the Govt. of Himachal Pradesh, order dated 26 September 2018.
  27. Matiur Rahman v. The Deputy Commissioner cum District Election Officer, Nagaon, El. Pet. 5/2011, order dated 20 April 2012.
  28. Zeneisiile Ate Loucii v. Neiphrezo Keditsu, El. Pet. 1/2015, order dated 13 July 2017 and 17 August 2017.
  29. Smt. Duter Padu v. Gadam Ete, El. Pet 3/2009, order dated 6 September 2011. See also, Bharat Chandra Narah v. Naba Kumar Doley, El. Pet 2/2011, order dated 12 September 2013.
  30. Some of the cases in the Gauhati High Court where delays were caused due to improper service of notice are Salma Jesmin v. Mazibur Rahman, El. Pet. 3/2011 order dated 28 October 2011, 12 December 2012, and 14 May 2013. In the Supreme Court, delays were caused due to faulty service of notice in Baldev Singh Mann v. Surjit Singh Dhiman, Civil Appeal No. 3700 of 2007; and P.A. Basheer v. C. K. Sidhikke, SLP (Civil) No. 3116 of 2012.
  31. Ravi Thakur v. Ram Lal Markanda, El. P 2/2018, orders dated 18 April 2018 and 3 May 2018 show that the High Court had to direct that notices initially served to incorrect addresses be sent to the correct addresses. The entire process consumed two months, 17 days (7 March 2018–24 May 2018). See also, Balbir Singh v. Secretary (Election) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, El. P 3/2018, orders dated 13 April 2018, 3 May 2018, and 31 May 2018, which show that the proper service of notice (after service at incorrect addresses) took 3 months, 8 days (12 March 2018–29 June 2018).
  32. Sureshchandra S/o Shankarrao v. The State (EP 200004/2018), order dated 8 February 2019; Sri Mohauddin Bava v. Dr Bharath Shetty Y (EP 10/2018), order dated 28 September 2018; Sri Maranna Dhilip Kumar v. Sri Sunil Subramani (EP 1/2014), order dated 8 March 2016.
  33. Kirren Rijju v. Takam Sanoy, El. Pet 2/2009, order dated 8 June 2011. Here, the Election Petition collapsed since none of the parties came forward to pursue the Election Petition.
  34. Kameng Dolo v. Atum Welly, SLP (Civil) Diary No. 16278/2015; Rajendra Bhausaheb Deshmukh v. Collector, Jalna, SLP (Civil) No. 29560/2010; Balbir Singh v. Amrik Singh, SLP (Civil) No. 32297/2013; and Sopan Abaji Pol v. Jaykumar Bhagwanrao Gore, Civil Appeal No. 8805 of 2013.
  35. Civil Appeal No. 8063 of 2015.
  36. Civil Appeal No. 8063 of 2015, order dated 1 October 2015.
  37. EP 04/2014.
  38. The case was registered on 12 September 2014 and the final order was pronounced on 12 July 2018.
  39. Ramadevi and Mendiratta, How India Votes, 1081.
  40. 1994 Supp (3) SCC 5, para 39.
  41. Makhan Lal Bangal v. Manas Bhunia, (2001) 2 SCC 652.
  42. EP 01/2017.
  43. EP 05/2014.
  44. The election petition was registered on 4 July 2014 and final order was delivered on 12 September 2017. Examination of witnesses began on 1 September 2015 and continued till 31 July 2017.
  45. Radhe Shyam Dhakad v. Jaivardhan Singh (EP 05/2014), order dated 9 September 2015.
  46. Bharat Chandra Narah v. Naba Kumar Doley, El. Pet 2/2011.
  47. Ramadevi and Mendiratta, How India Votes, pp. 1149–1450.
  48. P.C. Thomas v. PM Ismail, Civil Appeal No. 5033 of 2016; Election Commission of India v. Yadavrao, Civil Appeal No. 5879 of 2010; Dharmendra Yadav v. Dharam Yadav, SLP (Civil) No. 6866-6867/2010; Dilip Kumar Jaiswal v. Aftab Azmi, SLP (Civil) No. 26194/2010; Vivek Raghnath Pandit v. Hitendra Vishnu Thakur, Civil Appeal No. 1544 of 2010; Ajaib Singh Mukhmailpura v. Madan Lal Thekedar, Civil Appeal No. 4004 of 2010; Balbir Singh v. Amrik Singh, SLP (Civil) No. 17242/2010; Vishwas Sarang v. Tarun Sharma, SLP (Civil) No. 22189/2010; Ashok Kheny v. Ambraham TJ, SLP (Civil No) 19727/2014, order dated 27.10.2014; SAK Mynoddin v. Anna Venkata Rama Babu, Civil Appeal No. 7624 of 2012; Sushma Swaraj v. Raj Kumar Patel, SLP (Civil) No. 2951 of 2014; VM Singh v. Feroze Varun Gandhi, Civil Appeal No. 9942 of 2011; Narottam Mishra v. Rajendra Bharti, SLP (Civil) No. 14984/2010; and Navjot Singh Sidhu v. Prakash Soni, SLP (Civil) No. 14912/2011, order dated 18 January 2016.
  49. Civil Appeal No. 8063 of 2015.
  50. SLP (Civil) No. 14912/2011.