It 83is not easy to define the term judicial administration exhaustively. More than once, people tend to confuse judicial administration with the judicial process of adjudicating cases and delivering justice. Nevertheless, we can describe this term in terms of functions and objectives. Generally, judicial administration refers to the system of management and governance of the courts of law. It consists of practices, procedures, and offices that deal with the management of a court’s overall machinery.¹ According to a report of the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), judicial administration is a set of resources required for the organisation, structuring, and functioning of the tasks assigned to the justice system and its proceedings.² In essence, the objective of judicial administration is to give administrative support to judges for efficiently performing their judicial and constitutional duties.

Quality of Justice and Judicial Performance

Judicial adjudication of cases by judges and judicial administration form two sides of the same coin. When we talk about the judiciary, the common man sees only the former as the primary feature of the judiciary. However, for judges to execute their duties and for litigants to access and benefit from the justice system, efficient administration of courts is essential.

The quality of judges and their judgments are not the only characteristics that ensure quality of justice. For adequate operation of courts, proper tools of case management as well as sufficient financial resources which make it possible for judges to hear cases and make decisions in an expedient, effective, 84and efficient manner are inevitable.³ In addition, the massive impact which the judicial system has on the society means that it is essentially about the citizens who approach courts for justice. Therefore, court machinery should be managed in such a way that the litigants find access easy. For example, an improper system of case management could lead to delay in disposing of cases.

Theories about quality in organisations have as their impetus the idea that not only should an organisation be able to fulfil its tasks in an efficient and effective manner, but it should also be customer or client-oriented.⁴ Such an approach will consequently help in gaining the trust of litigants, who are the customers of the judiciary in a lighter sense.

Efficient judicial administration is a criterion that ensures quality of justice systems, and it can be considered as a credible yardstick for evaluating judicial performance. Evaluation of judicial performance covers performance of judges as well as the judiciary as an institution. It is important to measure judicial performance, but care must be taken to use the proper methods. For example, quality of judgments cannot be assessed quantitatively.

Value of Judicial Administration: A Comparative Study

This section will examine the various reforms adopted to improve fairness and efficiency of the judiciary as an institution in Ireland, South Africa, Netherlands, Philippines, and the United Kingdom (UK). The analysis of results achieved by some of those reforms will demonstrate that judicial administration is a non-negotiable aspect for the judiciary to achieve a certain standard in the quality of justice.

Ireland

Since 1924, the administration of courts in Ireland, including management of courts, funding, judicial salaries, and human resource management, was within the authority of the executive, represented by the Ministry of Justice. However in 1995, after persistent demands from the judiciary, the Irish government constituted a working group to assess the possibility of having an independent administrative agency.⁵ Based on its recommendations, the Courts Service Act, 1998 was enacted, and an independent agency called the ‘Courts Service’ was established.

The Courts Service is governed by a board comprising 17 members, of whom nine are from the judiciary, including the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ireland, who is its Chairperson. Other members include the chief executive officer of Courts Service, lawyers, Ministry of Justice representatives, Courts Service staff, and an expert in matters of finance, commerce, and administration.⁶ The broad functions of the Courts Service are to manage the courts, provide support services for judges, provide information on the courts system to the public, provide facilities for users of the courts, and provide, manage, and maintain court buildings.⁷ The Courts Service’s organisational structure is comparable to that of a corporate house, and has several divisions of work responsibilities. For example, there are separate departments for management of the Supreme Court and High Courts on one side and Circuit and District Courts on the other. Further, there are separate committees for infrastructure matters, human resource management, and development of reform measures.⁸

In 2014, the Courts Service completed the Combined Office Project, which restructured several circuit court and district court offices and their staff in county towns to create a unified court office with a common manager, deputy manager, 85and county registrars. This project resulted in reducing the number of circuit and district court offices by half between 2010 and 2014.⁹ This was an innovative measure to reduce expenditure on travel and payroll of personnel, and maintenance costs and lease expense of buildings. More importantly, it made access more convenient for litigants easily by situating court offices at one location. These and other similar measures — reorganisation of court venues and securing accommodation for circuit court judges near their assigned courts, which meant less travel and more time to hear cases — helped the Courts Service reduce the judiciary’s expenditure, and since 2008, expenses fell by 30 per cent.¹⁰ Another reform that the Courts Service facilitated helped in faster disposal of asylum pleas. The number of sittings across the country for hearing asylum cases was increased, and an additional judge was appointed.¹¹ This meant that that the litigants’ waiting time for disposal of asylum cases reduced from 30 months to nine months by the end of 2014.¹²

In the 2014 European Union Justice Scoreboard released by the European Commission, the Irish legal system was ranked second in Europe in terms of the level of judicial independence.¹³ The independent agency model of judicial administration via the Courts Service, acting as the middle path between the judiciary and the executive in terms of court administration, meant that the judiciary was less dependent on the executive. Further, with the administrative burden shared, judges could focus more on their judicial functions.

South Africa

In a lecture he delivered at the University of Stellenbosch on 25 April 2013, the Chief Justice of South Africa, Mr Mogoeng Mogoeng, cited preparation of court budgets without consultation with the judiciary, inadequately trained staff, and shortage of courtrooms and chambers for judges as some main problems relating to judicial administration.¹⁴ The movement for a more judiciary-led court administration system resulted in the enactment of the Superior Court Act, 2013 which vests certain judicial administration powers with the newly developed Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ). The OCJ is mainly authorised to (a) provide legal and administrative support to the Chief Justice; (b) provide communication services and internal coordination; (c) develop courts’ administration policies, norms, and standards; and (d) support the judicial functions of the Constitutional Court and activities of the Judicial Service Commission and the South African Judicial Education Institute.¹⁵

One of the first reforms initiated by the OCJ was the introduction of Norms and Standards for the Performance of Judicial Functions (NSPJF) on 28 February 2014.¹⁶ The NSPJF was formulated to tackle issues such as judicial delays and substandard performance of judicial officers.¹⁷ It introduced some significant norms and standards, such as:

1. No matter may be enrolled for hearing unless it is certified ‘trial ready’ by the concerned judge and judges must ensure there is compliance with all applicable timelines.

2. Every civil case must be finalised within one year of the date of issuance of summons (High Courts) and within nine months (magistrates’ courts). For criminal cases, judges must ensure that every accused person pleads to the charge within three months from the date of first appearance and efforts must be made to finalise the case within six months thereafter.

3. Judgments should not be reserved without fixing a date for pronouncing it and efforts should be made to give judgments within three months after the last hearing (unless there exists exceptional circumstances).

86In a workshop organised by the OCJ in March 2014 to review the efficiency of these norms (which were tested on a pilot basis), it was revealed that trial dates, after certification by a judge in the Western Cape High Court, were being allocated within three months, as opposed to two years.¹⁸ Further, in the Kwazulu-Natal division of the High Court, waiting time for trial dates had reduced from one year to between six and eight months.¹⁹

Official statistics also suggest that implementation of the NSPJF has resulted in reducing case backlog.²⁰ According to the data released by the 2015 Estimates of National Expenditure Report, given in Table 1, the number of criminal cases on the backlog roll in the High Court divisions had reduced every year.²¹

TABLE 1. Reduction in Backlog of Cases

Therefore, a transition from the executive model of judicial administration to a judiciary-led model has helped the South African judiciary make progress in terms of institutional efficiency.

Netherlands

In European Union member countries such as France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Sweden, and Denmark, several models of Councils for the Judiciary were in place for a long time. The main task of these councils was to function as intermediaries between the government and the judiciary for administering the courts and managing its resources.²² The judicial administration system in Netherlands has closely followed the path taken by these countries.

The Judicial Organisation Act was enacted in 2002 and the Council for the Judiciary, an independent body, was set up under this statute to evaluate the quality of the judicial system and provide support for the management of courts, like preparing budgets.²³ Additionally, the Council has to handle the automation and information provision within the courts, housing and security, quality of the work processes, organisation of the courts, and personnel matters. The Council has five members — three judicial members and two from outside the judiciary who must be experts in finance and organisation matters.²⁴

The central aim of the Council in its initial years was to deal with the issue of lengthy court proceedings. To regulate criminal trials, the Council implemented two main measures. In 2004, a National Coordination Centre for Mega Cases was opened.²⁵ This centre is responsible for the initial examination of big and high-priority criminal cases, such as organised crime or terrorism, which require several hearings and greater resources. Thereafter, the centre considers the workload of the concerned court with jurisdiction and the need for specialised judges. Subsequently, along with the president of the criminal court, the centre decides the court to which the particular mega case must be allotted for hearing. This programme was intended to reduce the burden of smaller criminal courts that would not have the necessary resources, specialised judges, and the requisite time to spend on a complex matter. The Council also developed the ‘adjournment protocol’, which described specific situations when adjournments could be granted.²⁶ This measure removed unnecessary discretion from the hands of judges and indirectly contributed to the cause of ensuring time-bound trial proceedings.

87A most frequently mentioned problem was the unreasonable delay in the proceedings of particularly civil and administrative cases.²⁷ To reduce pendency of civil cases, a centralised judicial unit called the ‘Flying Brigade’, composed of 6 judges and around 30 law clerks, was instituted. The Flying Brigade assists overburdened courts in reducing the number of pending cases by preparing draft judgments for cases that have been already heard. The Brigade has prepared around 8,000 draft decisions.²⁸ These reforms considerably aided in reducing the average duration of civil case proceedings, from 626 days in 1998 to 436 days in 2012.²⁹ Further, according to the surveys conducted by the Council, the number of litigants satisfied about the waiting time for trials had increased from 48 per cent in 1998 to 78 per cent in 2013.³⁰ Notably, the general satisfaction of litigants about the court process and administration has also increased from 66 per cent to 78 per cent in the same period.

One of the most unique strategies used by the Council is the output-based budget allocation system.³¹ According to this system, the judiciary would be allocated funds in accordance with its productivity, that is, the number of cases disposed in the year previous to the budget year. This incentive-based system was reviewed by the Deetman Committee in December 2006, and found that during the period 2002–2005³² there was a moderate (8 per cent) increase in overall productivity.³³

Therefore, statistics and survey results illustrate that apart from the decline in delay of case proceedings, there has been an overall rise in the level of judicial administration after the Council was established in 2002.³⁴

Philippines

In 2002, some regional trial courts (RTCs) in the Philippines witnessed an average of 268 new cases being filed every month. However, only 234 cases were disposed of in that entire year.³⁵ In addition, one RTC had 130 cases in its registry that were pending for more than nine years.³⁶ On 1 July 2003, as part of its action programme for judicial reform, the Supreme Court of the Philippines introduced a pilot project on case flow management in selected RTCs and metropolitan trial courts (MTCs).³⁷ Under this scheme, incoming cases were categorised as:

1. Fast track (cases requiring very minimal judicial interference).

2. Complex track (cases requiring the most judicial interference).

3. Standard track (cases requiring normal judicial interference).

The allotment for each case was to be decided by the concerned judge in consultation with the lawyers and the parties based on nature of the case, evidence to be produced, and claims and defence of parties.³⁸ Each of these tracks had different timeframe requirements and would be tracked using software. If it was found that the cases were not progressing according to prescribed timelines, the case details would be coloured in red so that court office clerks could check regularly and ensure that all the cases were brought back to the track. The evaluation of this pilot project evidenced positive results. At the MTC level, of all the cases filed after 1 July 2003, 95 per cent of civil cases and 90 per cent of criminal cases were disposed of according to the set time frames.³⁹ At the RTC level, disposal of cases increased from 2,750 cases in 2002 to 3,600 during July–December 2003.

United Kingdom⁴⁰

After the enactment of the Constitutional Reform Act, 2005 (CRA),⁴¹ the Lord Chancellor’s position 88was converted to that of a Secretary of State and like other cabinet ministers, a member of the legislature.⁴² The judicial authority of Lord Chancellor as the head of the judiciary was transferred to the Lord Chief Justice.⁴³ The Lord Chief Justice is responsible for representing views of the judiciary to the parliament, training of judges, and allocation of work within the courts.⁴⁴ This was a key reform in terms of strengthening judicial independence in the UK. Apart from restructuring the Lord Chancellor’s Office, the CRA established the Supreme Court of the UK, which absorbed the judicial functions of the House of Lords.⁴⁵

Even though the Lord Chief Justice is the head of the judicial system, administration of courts is not solely his responsibility under the CRA. Administration of the Supreme Court is supervised by the chief executive, a non-ministerial statutory office formed by Section 48, CRA. The chief executive’s main duties are to manage finance and audit reports, regulate and supervise work of the staff, and ensure the infrastructural quality of court buildings and courtrooms.⁴⁶ For the administration of all other courts and tribunals in the UK, there is an agency called Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS) within the Ministry of Justice.⁴⁷ Unlike the chief executive for the Supreme Court, members of HMCTS include representatives from the Ministry of Justice.⁴⁸

After the structural reforms in 2006, a significant measure initiated for better judicial administration was the better case management (BCM) programme,⁴⁹ introduced through the Criminal Procedure Rules, 2015 and the Criminal Practice Directions, 2015, which took effect from 5 October 2015. The central scheme under this programme is the Early Guilty Plea Scheme.⁵⁰ In the UK, the majority of criminal cases result in guilty pleas.⁵¹ Under this scheme, magistrates’ courts will engage in early review of those cases that are likely to result in guilty pleas with the help of the concerned lawyers and parties to discover the core issues in those cases.⁵² The rules require that all the cases must be listed for the first hearing in the Crown Court within 28 days after being sent from the magistrates’ court.⁵³ This is to ensure that the first hearing is as effective as possible, and if the accused pleads guilty at the hearing, the judges must be able to order the sentence as soon as possible.⁵⁴ In other cases, the courts must issue clear directions and list the case for trial without the need for interim hearings.⁵⁵

To supplement schemes under the BCM programme, the Crown Court Digital Case System (DCS) was also launched simultaneously. The DCS creates digital versions of the case files in courts. It allows the parties, lawyers, and the judges to upload and access case documents, make notes and present cases in the courts digitally in an orderly manner.⁵⁶ For example, prosecution evidence will be deemed to be served when it is uploaded on the DCS and a notification is sent by email to the other party.

As these are newly introduced schemes, there is no reliable empirical evidence that reveals its outcomes. For evaluation of such initiatives, HMCTS conducts surveys and opinion polls among citizens who use the courts. Based on these surveys, usually HMCTS publishes the results with a ranking that corresponds to the right level of quality of the courts and thus promotes a competition between the courts.⁵⁷

Conclusion

Judiciaries in every part of the world are under pressure owing to increase in case backlog, lack of institutional independence, substandard performance of judicial officers, and so on. In response, governments and judiciaries have developed reform strategies and new institutions to deal with those 89problems. Importantly, they have looked to improve judicial administration for the convenience of litigants and other court users, who seek an effective judiciary for securing justice and their rights.

An effective judiciary is predictable, resolves cases in a reasonable time frame, and is accessible to the public.⁵⁸ Predictability can be understood in terms of the consistency of judgments and legal principles developed by courts as well as that of court proceedings. Accessibility can be measured in terms of the existence of constitutional or legal rights to approach courts for grievance redressal as well as the convenience in using the court machinery to file their cases and getting justice. Resolving cases within a reasonable time frame is also not merely about the judicial process of judging a case, but also depends on a well-administered court management and case flow system. Hence, the effectiveness and quality of the judiciary is certainly dependent on the standard of both judicial adjudication and judicial administration.

Notes

1. Legal Information Institute. 2015. ‘Judicial Information, Cornell Law School’, available online at https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/judicial_administration (accessed on 19 February 2016).

2. Laurent Berthier and Hélène Pauliat. 2008. ‘Administration and Management of Judicial Systems in Europe’, CEPEJ Studies No. 10, available online at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/series/Etudes10Admin_en.pdf (accessed on 19 February 2016).

3. CEPEJ. 2008. ‘Checklist for Promoting the Quality of Justice and the Courts’, Working Group on the Quality of Justice, CEPEJ, available online at http://www.courtexcellence.com/~/media/Microsites/Files/ICCE/ChecklistforPromoting.ashx (accessed on 19 February 2016).

4. Gar Yein Ng, Marco Velicogna, and Cristina Dallara. 2008. ‘Monitoring and Evaluation of Court System: A Comparative Study’, CEPEJ Studies No. 6, available online at https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/series/Etudes6Suivi_en.pdf (accessed on 19 February 2016).

5. P.J. Fitzpatrick. 2008. ‘Management of the Courts: The Irish Experience’, International Journal for Court Administration, 1(2).

6. S. 11, Courts Service Act, 1998.

7. S. 5, Courts Service Act, 1998.

8. Courts Service. 2014. ‘Courts Service Annual Report 2014’, available online at http://www.courts.ie/Courts.ie/library3.nsf/(WebFiles)/ 76D5C7C737385EFF80257E91002F3D7A/$FILE/Courts%20Service%20Annual%20Report%202014.pdf (accessed on 19 February 2016).

9. Courts Service, ‘Annual Report 2014’.

10. Alison Healy. 2014. ‘Courts Service Highlights Savings Made in Judges’ Expenses Since 2008’, The Irish Times, 4 December, available online at http://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/courts-service-highlights-savings-made-in-judges-expenses-since-2008-1.2026093 (accessed on 19 February 2016).

11. Courts Service. 2012. ‘Courts Service Annual Report 2012’, available online at http://www.courts.ie/Courts.ie/library3.nsf/(WebFiles)/ 87BE463114EF96FF80257BA20033953B/$FILE/Courts%20Service%20Annual%20Report%202012.pdf (accessed on 19 February 2016).

12. Courts Service, ‘Annual Report 2014’.

13. Mark Hilliard. 2014. ‘Ireland Scores well on Perceptions of Judicial Independence - EU Survey’, The Irish Times, 14 April, available online at http://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/ireland-scores-well-on-perceptions-of-judicial-independence-eu-survey-1.1757381 (accessed on 19 February 2016).

14. Mogoeng Mogoeng. 2013. ‘The Implications of the Office of the Chief Justice for Constitutional Democracy in South Africa’, Annual Human Rights Lecture at the University of Stellenbosch, available online at http://blogs.sun.ac.za/seraj/files/2013/04/2013-Annual-Human-Rights-Lecture-Stellenbosch-University-25-April-2013_FINAL.pdf (accessed on 19 February 2016).

15. ISS Africa. 2015. ‘Estimates of National Expenditure: National Treasury Republic of South Africa’, available online at https://www.issafrica.org/crimehub/uploads/Vote%2022%20Office%20of%20the%20Chief%20Justice%20and%20Judicial%20Administration.pdf (accessed on 19 February 2016).

16. The full text of NSPJF is available online at http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/notices/2014/2014-02-28-gg37390_gon147-supcourts.pdf (accessed on 19 February 2016).

17. 90Mogoeng, ‘The Implications of the Office of the Chief Justice’.

18. South African Legal Information Institute (SAFLII). 2014. ‘Workshop on Progress on Judicial Case-flow Management’, available online at http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/DEREBUS/2014/65.html (accessed on 19 February 2016).

19. SAFLII, ‘Workshop on Progress on Judicial Case-flow Management’.

20. The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development defines case backlog as all the cases pending longer than 12 months on the High Court roll, 6 months on the District Court roll, and 9 months on the Regional Court roll; see, http://www.psc.gov.za/documents/2013/FINAL%20REPORT%20DOJCS%20NATIONAL%20(C)26%20JAN%20%202012%20docx.pdf (accessed on 19 February 2016).

21. ISS Africa, ‘Estimates of National Expenditure’.

22. Wim Voermans. 1999. ‘Councils for the Judiciary in EU countries’, TAIEX Bureau: European Commission, available online at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/Voermans_article.pdf (accessed on 19 February 2016).

23. Ng, Velicogna, and Dallara, ‘Monitoring and Evaluation of Court System’.

24. Philip Langbroek. 2010. ‘Organization Development of the Dutch Judiciary, between Accountability and Judicial Independence’, International Journal for Court Administration, 2(2): 21–30.

25. Pim Albers. 2005. ‘Reducing Delays: Recent Developments in the Netherlands’, Presentation at the Conference on Practical Ways of Combating Delays in the Justice System, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 27–28 September. Strasbourg: CEPEJ.

26. Albers, ‘Reducing Delays’.

27. Frans van Dijk. 2014. ‘Improved Performance of the Netherlands Judiciary: Assessment of the Gains for Society’, International Journal for Court Administration, 6(1): 83–99.

28. Albers, ‘Reducing Delays’.

29. van Dijk, ‘Improved Performance of the Netherlands Judiciary’.

30. van Dijk, ‘Improved Performance of the Netherlands Judiciary’.

31. Langbroek, ‘Organization Development of the Dutch Judiciary’.

32. Even though this system was officially introduced only in 2005, the courts had started aiming at increased productivity even when the system was being installed in draft stages since 2002.

33. Langbroek, ‘Organization Development of the Dutch Judiciary’.

34. In her work, Quality of Justice: Quality Improvement and the Role of the Council, published in 2010, Rutten-van Deursen, a lecturer at Tilburg University Law School, praised the Council for its positive contributions towards improving the quality of the judicial system in Netherlands. See, C.H. Van Rhee and Remme Verkerk. 2014. ‘The Netherlands: A No-Nonsense Approach to Civil Procedure Reform’, in C.H. Van Rhee and Yulin Fu (eds.), Civil Litigation in China and Europe: Essays on the Role of the Judge and the Parties, pp. 259–280. Dordrecht: Springer.

35. Zenaida N. Elepano. 2009. ‘Case Management Reform: The Philippine Experience’, in Asia Pacific Judicial Reform Forum (ed.), Searching for Success in Judicial Reform: Voices from the Asia Pacific Experience, pp. 81–110. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

36. The Philippines Statistics Authority defines case backlog as the number of cases resolved or transferred to other courts during the year (case outflow) subtracted from sum total of the number of newly filed cases during the year and the number of cases pending at the end of the previous year (case load); see, http://www.nscb.gov.ph/beyondthenumbers/2013/06132013_jrga_courts.asp (accessed on 19 February 2016).

37. Elepano, ‘Case Management Reform’.

38. Elepano, ‘Case Management Reform’.

39. Elepano, ‘Case Management Reform’.

40. In this section, only information relating to England and Wales will be discussed.

41. It came into force on 3 April 2006.

42. Prior to this, he was a senior cabinet member, Speaker of the House of Lords, and the head of the judiciary. See, ‘The Justice System and the Constitution’, Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, available online at https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-judiciary-the-government-and-the-constitution/jud-acc-ind/justice-sys-and-constitution/ (accessed on 19 February 2016).

43. The Lord Chief Justice presides over the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court.

44. Courts and Tribunals Judiciary. 2015. ‘Judicial Office (JO)’, available online at https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/training-support/jo-index/ (accessed on 19 February 2016).

45. S. 23, CRA.

46. Karim Benyekhlef, Clea Iavarone-Turcotte, and Nicolas Vermeys. 2011. ‘Comparative Analysis of Key Characteristics of Court Administration Systems’, Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, available online at 91https://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/AJC/Comparative%20Analysis%20of%20Administration%20Systems%202013-03.pdf (accessed on 19 February 2016).

47. Benyekhlef, Iavarone-Turcotte, and Vermeys, Comparative Analysis of Key Characteristics.

48. Benyekhlef, Iavarone-Turcotte, and Vermeys, Comparative Analysis of Key Characteristics.

49. Courts and Tribunals Judiciary. 2015. ‘Better Case Management Information Pack’, available online at https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/ 2015/09/better-case-management-information-pack-3.pdf (accessed on 19 February 2016).

50. Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, ‘Better Case Management Information Pack’.

51. Legal Aid Agency. 2015. ‘Better Case Management’, available online at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/482658/better-case-management-guidance.pdf (accessed on 19 February 2016).

52. Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, ‘Better Case Management Information Pack’.

53. Judiciary of England and Wales, ‘Better Case Management Information Pack’.

54. Courts and Tribunals Judiciary. 2015. ‘Better Case Management Newsletter, Issue 2’, 2 October, available online at https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/bcm-newsletter-2-12102015.pdf (accessed on 19 February 2016).

55. Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, ‘Better Case Management Newsletter, Issue 2’.

56. Courts and Tribunals Judiciary. 2015. ‘Better Case Management Newsletter, Issue 3’, 13 November, available online at https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/BCM-Newsletter-Issue3-13112015.pdf (accessed on 19 February 2016).

57. Loic Cadiet, Jean-Paul Jean, Helene Pauliat, Aurelie Binet-Grosclaude, and Caroline Foulquier. 2012. ‘Better Administering for Better Judging’, International Journal for Court Administration, 4(3): 35–40.

58. Maria Dakolias. 1999. ‘Court Performance around the World: A Comparative Perspective’, The World Bank, Technical Paper No. 430, available online at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1999/07/440392/court-performance-around-world-comparative-perspective (accessed on 19 February 2016).